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"Don't Bother to Smile
When You Call Me That"
-Fighting Words
and
the First Amendment
By

THOMAS

F. SHEA*

According to Owen Wister, certain words, at least when
spoken without a disarming smile, are likely to provoke swift
physical retaliation.' Kipling put it with characteristic clarity:
"[Y]ou must not call a man a bastard unless you are prepared
'2
to prove it on his front teeth."
In order to forestall such violence-prone confrontations, it
would seem desirable for society to prevent the insulting utterances which precipitate them in the first instance. Presumably
laws effecting that result would advance society's undeniable
interest in preserving the peace in two ways: by initially deterring the employment of abusive language and, where the
speaker has not been deterred, by encouraging the recipient to
seek redress through the judicial process rather than to rely on
more immediate and more primitive means of obtaining satisfaction. Moreover, since experience teaches that face to face
insults often, though certainly not invariably, lead to violence
on the part of the addressee, a rational basis for the prohibiting
legislation is obviously present.
The flaw in this analysis is, however, that it does not consider the fact that even insulting, "fighting words" are a form
of speech and as such seem to steer laws punishing them onto
a collision course with the first amendment. Because of a failure to discern that such a collision is not inevitable, a majority
*Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Cathedral
College, 1957; LL.B., St. John's University, 1960; LL.M., New York University, 1968.
1 0. WISTER, When You Call Me That, Smile, in THE VIRGINIAN ch. 2 (1902).
2 R. KIPLING, The Drums of the Fore and Aft, in KIPLING'S STORIES 8 (1931).
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of the United States Supreme Court has gradually concluded
that fighting words, no matter how narrowly defined, are a
protected form of speech and that as a result a mere rational
basis is no longer sufficient to justify punitive legislation.' The
anomolous result of this determination is to permit a state to
penalize a speaker who insults a burly construction worker
while forbidding the punishment of the reviler of a wheelchairbound quadriplegic.
ConstitutionalBackground
How the Supreme Court came to paint itself into this jurisprudential corner may perhaps best be understood by beginning with an examination of the first amendment itself, which
provides: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .. Although the term "Congress" indicates that the first amendment is directed only
against abridgements of speech on the part of the federal government, its mandate, applied through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, has been held to require state
laws regulating speech to pass constitutional muster.' And despite the use of absolute terms-"Congress shall make no law
. . ."-the Supreme Court has never assigned an absolute
meaning to the first amendment. Accordingly, it has been
deemed self-evident that certain forms of speech may be constitutionally punished. For example, it has never been seriously
contended that a verbal agreement to commit murder or to
distribute heroin may find immunity through the incantation
of the theurgic phrase "freedom of speech". 7 As Mr. Justice
Holmes stated:
"

See notes 34-102 and accompanying text infra.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
' Justices Black and Douglas have occasionally contended for an absolute interpretation with respect to some forms of expression. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 449-50, 457 (1969) (concurring opinions); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964) (concurring opinions); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
275, 286 (1952) (dissenting opinions).
7

See generally B. SCHWARTZ,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

263-64 (1972). Other instances

of speech as criminal conduct unprotected by the first amendment are extortion,
blackmail and fraudulent representation. Id. "What is a threat must be distinguished
from what is constitutionally protected speech." Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
707 (1969).
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We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder
within the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech."
In contrast, laws punishing forms of speech which arguably tend only to communicate ideas, concepts or opinions are
more difficult to harmonize with the first amendment. The
difficulty can be lessened, however, by an a priori determination that the particular expression sought to be punished belongs to a class of utterances which, like speech as an instrumentality of common crime, simply ought not to be protected
by the first amendment. The Gordian knot may thereby be cut
rather than unraveled. An example of this approach which has
occasioned little dispute is the assignment of unprotected status to "commercial" speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen,I the
Supreme Court, against a first amendment challenge, upheld
a local ordinance totally banning the distribution of advertising
handbills in the city streets, saying "[T]he Constitution imposes no [first amendment] restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."10 After the determination that commercial speech was unprotected, the ordinance
prohibiting the handbills was readily sustainable because legislation punishing or regulating unprotected speech requires only
a "[r]ational connection between the remedy provided and
the evil to be curbed . . . ."" Since handbills often become a
form of litter, a rational basis for the law existed.
On the other hand, if the speech in question is considered
constitutionally protected it may be punished only if it creates
a "clear and present danger" of bringing about substantive
evils which the government has a right to prevent.' 2 Furthermore, since freedom of speech has been said to enjoy a pre, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
1 Id. at 54. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973), the Court declined to overrule Chrestensenand reasserted its basic
satisfaction with the treatment of purely commercial speech as unprotected by the first
amendment.
1 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). See Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
,1 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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ferred position in the hierarchy of constitutional values, 3 it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court has required that such
danger must be extremely serious and very imminent before
the speaker or writer may be punished." Even when the speech
sought to be penalized involves advocacy of the use of illegitimate force, it remains immune as a communication of ideas
unless, under the actual ambient circumstances, it also constitutes the incitement of imminent lawless action and is very
likely to produce that action.' 5
Accordingly, when the Supreme Court announced in Roth
v. United States" that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press,' 7 it was holding
that obscene speech might be prohibited or punished, without
the necessity of establishing that the obscene material constitutes a clear and present serious danger to society, if there
existed merely a rational basis for doing so.' 8 Such a rational
basis was found in the belief that obscenity is to some extent
at least responsible for antisocial behavior.'9 Unfortunately for
the Court, it still remained necessary to determine whether a
given expression was, in fact, obscene and the Justices wrestled
with that task during the fifteen years following Roth.' Never'3Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 103 (1942).
," Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
' Id. at 485.
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969).
, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
-"See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). The
latest definition of obscenity is the most specific:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth v. United
States, supra, at 489; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
Miller v. California, supra at 24.
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theless, despite the problems encountered in defining the elusive subject matter, a majority of the Court has never retreated
from the initial determination that obscenity, once discerned,
2
is not to be accorded the protection of the first amendment. '
A similar beginning in the area of libel and slander yielded
a very different result. InNear v. Minnesota,22 the Court struck
down a law permitting the enjoining of future libelous publications because such a law would countenance an unconstitutional "previous restraint" on freedom of the press. The Court
made it clear that the same libelous utterances might be punished despite the first amendment after they had been published:
But it is recognized that punishment for the abuse of liberty
accorded to the press is essential to the protection of the
public, and that the common law rules that subject the libeler to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the
private injury, are not abolished by the protection extended
in our constitutions.?
That the Court remained sure of its ground twenty years
after Near was made manifest in Beauharnaisv. Illinois,24 a
criminal prosecution for libelling a class of persons rather than
an individual. The defendant sought the protection of the first
amendment, arguing that he could be punished only if his
statements were "likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil .... -21Justice Frankfurter replied:
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the
State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase "clear
and present danger." Certainly no one would contend that
obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a
showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in
the same class. 6
11Miller

v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). The possession and use of obscene

material within a private home was held protected in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), not because the obscene matter deserved protection but because the privacy
of the home did.
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Id. at 715.
21343 U.S. 250 (1952).
r Id. at 253.
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Although a clearer statement of the law would be difficult
to imagine, a new departure occured twelve years later in the
celebrated case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.? Sullivan,
a police commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, brought a
civil libel action against the New York Times based on its
printing of an advertisement which allegedly defamed him in
connection with his supervision of the Montgomery police in
their dealings with Martin Luther King. The statements in the
advertisement were concededly inaccurate; however, the Times
argued that the newspaper was protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of the press. Sullivan, of course, rejoined
that libel was entitled to no such protection, citing
Beauharnais.It must have come as something of a shock to
Sullivan when the Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, held
flatly to the contrary, declaring that "[1]ibel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must
be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment. ' 28 The Court went on to state that where a public official's conduct is the target, a false defamatory statement may
be punished only when made with malice; that is, made with
knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard
of whether it is false or not. 29 In other words, the Court held
that in some circumstances the first amendment guarantees
the right to publish falsehood as long as it is not done maliciously.
Subsequently, the New York Times rationale was extended to protect false defamatory material aimed at public
figures who were not public officials,30 and even at private citizens who had found themselves, voluntarily or not, involved in
a single event of public or general interest.3 ' The Supreme
Court, however, has recently held that where defamatory, false
statements are about a person who is not a public figure, the
defamer may not claim the New York Times protection even
32
though the statement dealt with an issue of public interest.
Id. at 266.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 269.
29Id. at 279-80.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
31 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
31 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., U.S. (1974), 42 U.S.L.W. 5123 (June 25,
1974).
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At present, therefore, a statement falsely defamatory of a private person, even if it concerns a matter of public interest, may
be punished without the necessity of establishing the defamer's
knowledge of the falsity of his statement or his reckless indifference thereto. But if libelous utterances still enjoy protected
status-which requires a showing of clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil before they may be punished-it
appears the Court has recognized that the requisite clear and
present danger in private libel is the imminent injury to the
reputation and good name of the vilified citizen.
The danger, though, is no different in the case of the public
official; that is, injury to his good name. It seems, therefore,
that in New York Times the Court was engrafting a balancing
concept onto the "clear and present danger" test. The real,
imminent, substantive danger of injury to personal reputation
is balanced against the importance to the general welfare of the
expression sought to be punished. Where the expression is a
purely private defamatory falsehood, its value to the public is
slight, and the danger to an individual reputation outweighs it.
On the other hand, where the expression concerns public officials or public figures, the same danger pales beside the fundamental principle that debate on such matters should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
"33

Fighting Words
The diverging paths which led from the common starting
point of "unprotected speech" to the present treatment of libel
on one hand and obscenity on the other may nevertheless serve
to illuminate the path traveled by the Supreme Court as it has
grappled with the problems posed by laws punishing the vituperative and insulting language commonly called "fighting
words". Since fighting words are pure speech, unmixed with
action on the part of the speaker-unlike, for example, the
burning of a draft card 3 4-it is obvious that either an accommo1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1964): ". . . where the criticism is of public officials and
their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the
larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth."
" See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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dation with the first amendment or its total avoidance must
occur if these punitive measures are to survive.
A simple solution is always attractive and, as Occam
taught, very often correct. Thus the Supreme Court, as it did
when first faced with the constitutional issues presented by
libel and obscenity, initially held in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshiren" that fighting words belonged to a class of expression not protected by the first amendment. Chaplinsky, a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, had been addressing
passers-by on a city street when a disturbance occured. Approached by a city marshal Chaplinsky responded, "[Y]ou are
a God damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist",36 whereupon he was charged with violating a statute which prohibited,
inter alia, calling another
person by an "offensive or derisive
37
name" in a public place.
The Supreme Court noted that any vagueness problem
had been cured by prior interpretations of the statute by the
New Hampshire courts which had made clear that the only
words condemned were:
[S]uch as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence
by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed. [Tihe word "offensive" is not to be defined in terms
of what a particularaddressee thinks. . . . The test is what

men of common intelligence would understand would be
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight .... 11
It is apparent from the italicized language that the "clear and
present danger" test was not being applied. That is, it was not
an element of the offense that the particular addressee would
himself be likely to respond with violence to the fighting words
but only that an average person would be likely to do so. The
basis for applying this less stringent standard was simply that
the speech involved was not constitutionally protected. As Justice Murphy stated for the Court:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.

"
37

315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Id. at 569.

Id.
Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
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These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.3'
The Court had no difficulty in holding that Chaplinsky's remarks to the marshal fell within the fighting words classification and sustained his conviction.
The rationale for assigning unprotected status was that
fighting words as defined by the New Hampshire courts were
not a form of communicative speech but rather a medium of
something approaching a physical assault. In support of this
reasoning the Chaplinsky Court cited the opinion rendered two
years earlier in Cantwell v. Connecticut." Cantwell, another
Jehovah's Witness, had played a record which described the
Roman Catholic Church in offensive, derogatory terms before
two bystanders who happened to be Catholics. He was charged
with "inciting a breach of the peace" 4' although no violence
actually occurred. In overturning Cantwell's conviction, the
Court distinguished the expression of offensive ideas and beliefs from "profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to
the person of the hearer. ' 4 Such personal invectives could be
punished without more because "resort to epithets or personal
abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument. 4 3 In contrast, Cantwell's expression of beliefs,
even though unpopular and strongly at variance with those
held by his listeners, was protected. Even had he exhorted his
hearers to an immediate violent attack on any Catholics who
could be found in the vicinity, his conviction would be upheld
only if there existed a "clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order . . .-.
Cantwell's speech did not constitute fighting words because it
was not personally directed to his listeners. Since his utter"' Id. at 571-72.

0 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
1 Id. at 300.
12 Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
, Id. at 309-10.
" Id. at 308.
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ances were constitutionally protected, only a clear and present
danger that his audience would proceed to take illegal action
would justify his punishment, and that danger was not present.
The Court reaffirmed the doctrine that fighting words were
unprotected speech in deciding Terminiello v. Chicago45 seven
years later, although therein it reversed the conviction of the
defendant, a suspended Catholic priest, who had called his
adversaries (some of whom were inside the auditorium while
others were rioting outside) "slimy scum", "bedbugs",
"snake[s]" and "atheistic communistic jews".4 6 The ground
for reversal was not that the defendant's statements were not
fighting words, but rather that the "breach of the peace" statute under which he had been convicted was unconstitutionally
overbroad because, as construed by the Illinois courts, it permitted conviction not only for fighting words, but also for
speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance. ....-47
A conviction under a statute so broadly construed could not
stand since:
a function of free speech under our system of government is
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."
Thus, the Court failed to reach the question of whether Terminiello might have been properly convicted under a law narrowly
drawn to prohibit only fighting words.
Two years later, in Feiner v.New York, 4" the Court reiter337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Id. at 20-21 (facts in dissenting opinion).
Id. at 4 (quoting from the jury instructions).
/d.
Ix

340 U.S. 315 (1951).
The incitement to unlawful action which is punishable under the "clear and
present danger" test connotes violent action which is deliberately encouraged by the
speaker, as where he intentionally foments a fight between factions in his audience
or urges his listeners to go forth and burn down churches. The term does not refer to
violent action which may be inspired by the audience's hostility toward the speaker
or his message and the desire to summarily silence him. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S.
111 (1969). See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Hague v. CIO,307 U.S. 496
(1939). That it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two is demonstrated
in Feinerwhere the majority found that the defendant had incited an imminent riot
and the three dissenters contended that he had been punished for his listeners'
hostile reaction to the content of his message. Feiner, addressing a crowd of negroes
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ated that a speaker who incites his listeners to take riotous
action against others, as opposed to personally insulting his
addressees, may be constitutionally punished only if there exists a clear and present danger that unlawful action will actually occur. A pure "fighting words" issue, however, was not
presented in Feiner.
Accordingly, as of January, 1951, the date of the Feiner
decision, the law with respect to fighting words might be summarized as follows: (1) expressions of opinion or belief, no matter how unorthodox or hateful to the speaker's audience, were
constitutionally protected and could not be punished; (2) encouraging an audience to lawless action against others was also
protected unless there existed a clear and present danger that
the action would in fact occur; 0 and (3) fighting words, a form
of unprotected speech, could be punished under a statute narrowly drawn or narrowly interpreted to forbid face to face personal insults likely to cause the average person to react violently, whether or not the actual addressee was likely to so
react. Since fighting words, so defined, were not constitutionally protected, only a rational basis for their prohibition was
required. That basis could be found in the fact that the sensibilities of the addressees would be hurt by such statements as
well as in the likelihood that some addressees would reply with
force.-'
Almost twenty years after Feiner the Court indicated in
Street v. New York 52 that it was still satisfied with the treatment of fighting words as speech unprotected by the first
amendment. Street was convicted under a statute which made
it a misdemeanor to ". . . publicly . . mutilate, deface, deand whites, made derogatory remarks concerning the president, the mayor and other
local officials and urged that the negroes rise up in arms to fight for equal rights. The
crowd grew excited and one of them threatened violence, apparently against Feiner.
Feiner was convicted of inciting a breach of the peace. Justice Douglas, dissenting,
said:
A speaker may not, of course incite a riot any more than he may incite a
breach of the peace by the use of "fighting words".... But this record shows
no such extremes. It shows an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one
man to haul the speaker from the stage. It is against that kind of threat that
speakers need police protection.
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 331 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942): "'fighting words' those which by their very utterance inflict injury .
52 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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file, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by
words or act . . ." any American flag. 3 The defendant had
burned an American flag while saying, inter alia, "We don't
need no damn flag." 54 The Court reversed on the ground that
Street's conviction might have been based in part on the words
which he had uttered-words which, under the circumstances,
could not have been constitutionally punished. Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority of the Court, noted that Street's words
did not seek to incite others to violent acts55 and did not constitute fighting words under the Chaplinsky test:
[W]e cannot say that appellant's remarks were so inherently
inflammatory as to come within that small class of "fighting
words" which are "likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.""
By its verbatim quotation from Chaplinsky the court also reaffirmed the view that if a declaration constitutes fighting words
no clear and present danger of actual retaliation by the particular addressee need be shown as long as an average addressee
would be likely to react violently. 7
In 1971 the Court began to wrestle with the problems created by the use of vulgar language in public places, which at
first glance seemed to be beyond first amendment protection
because it amounted to obscenity or fighting words, or both. In
5" the defendant
Cohen v. California,
was convicted of disturbing the peace by "offensive conduct" for wearing, in a courthouse corridor, a jacket which bore the plainly visible words
"Fuck the Draft."5 9 In reversing, the Court, through Justice
Harlan, pointed out that Cohen's expression constituted pure
speech, not action, and did not "fall within those relatively few
categories of instances where prior decisions have established
"' Id. at 578.
' Id. at 579.

Id. at 591.
Id. at 592 (emphasis added). A similar result was reached in Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
"' The Court also noted that even if Street's utterances could be deemed fighting
words, the New York statute was not drawn narrowly enough to punish only words of
that character and there was no evidence that it had been so narrowly construed by
the New York courts. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id. at 16.
'
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the power of government to deal more comprehensively with
certain forms of individual expression simply upon a showing
that such a form was employed."6 Cohen's words were found
not to be obscene because their meaning was not, in the circumstances, erotic; and they were not fighting words because
they were not directed to any particular person. Thus, as recently as 1971, the Court saw no reason to vary the definition
of fighting words and confidently reasserted it:
[Tihe States are free to ban the simple use, without a demonstrationof additionaljustifying circumstances, of so-called
"fighting words," those personally abusive epithets which,
when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of
commbn knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.'
Finding that Cohen had not deliberately attempted to incite imminent violent action and that in fact none had occurred, the Court then considered a new issue: whether Cohen's
slogan, though not constituting fighting words, might be punished because it was an extremely distasteful mode of expres-.
sion thrust upon unwilling watchers whose sensitivities deserved protection. Noting that the expression was communicated in a public place and did not involve an invasion into the
viewers' homes, the Court answered in the negative, saying,
"[Wjords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force.""2 The majority was also disturbed by the
broadness and vagueness of the statutory prohibition of "offensive conduct," observing that "it is nevertheless often true that
6' 3
one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
In the aftermath of Cohen, therefore, the concept of fighting words as unprotected by the first amendment remained
intact, while vulgar language in general was deemed protected
speech. If Cohen had addressed similar expletives to the persons of passers-by in that courthouse corridor, his conviction
under a narrowly drawn fighting words statute would apparently have earned the approval of both the majority and the
dissenters.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.

KENTUCKY LAW

JouRNAL

[Vol. 63

Within a year of the Cohen decision, however, a majority
of the Supreme Court was ready to alter the traditional definition of unprotected fighting words. In Gooding v. Wilson,64 the
defendant, while picketing a U. S. Army headquarters building
in protest of the Viet Nam conflict, blocked the entrance so
that arriving inductees could not enter. When two policemen
attempted to remove him, Wilson said to one of them, "White
son of a bitch, I'll kill you," and "You son of a bitch, I'll choke
you to death." To the other he said, "You son of a bitch, if you
615
ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces.
If "God damned racketeer" could turn the trick,66 then
Wilson's language, employed in a face-to-face encounter,
should have been sufficient to constitute fighting words. However, the Court did not decide that point because, in the majority's view, the crucial question was whether the Georgia statute
involved was narrow enough to condemn fighting words without condemning protected speech along with them. 7 The statute provided:
Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence ... opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace. . . shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Surprisingly, the Court found the law overbroad because
the statutory language did not go on to explain that the prohibition was limited to (a) 'fighting words that were (b) likely to
cause acts of violence by the actual addressee." Justice Brennan, writing for the five-man majority, further stated that such
a narrow interpretation had never been applied to the ordinance by the Georgia courts. In arriving at these conclusions
the majority adopted a definition of fighting words which, for
405 U.S. 518 (1972).
Id. at 519, 520 n.1.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
A statute affecting speech which is overbroad on its face or as construed cannot
stand even if the words to which it is applied might have been constitutionally punished under a narrowly drawn law. This is contrary to the rule in non-first amendment
cases and is deemed necessary to discourage the enactment of sweeping prohibitions
which by their very existence might chill the exercise of free expression. Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972).
Id. at 523.
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all practical purposes, removed them from unprotected status
and placed them under the guardianship of the first amendment.
As previously noted, protected speech may not be constitutionally punished unless it creates a clear and present danger
of serious substantive evil in the circumstances in which it
occurs. Even a deliberate incitement to violent action is a form
of protected speech because it seeks to communicate an idea
and as such may be penalized only if it is likely that such action
will take place.7 Thus, exhorting a mob of infuriated hockey
fans to attack a referee as he leaves the arena would probably
be punishable, while urging a synod of bishops to burn down a
nearby synagogue would probably not be. In contrast, when the
Chaplinsky Court determined that fighting words were unprotected, it held that as a result they could be punished irrespective of a clear and present danger that the actual addressee
would become violent. To quote again from Chaplinsky in language curiously absent from the majority's opinion in Gooding
v. Wilson: "[tihe word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms
of what a particular addressee thinks."'
In Gooding, the majority found that an essential defect in
the statute, as interpreted by the Georgia courts, was a failure
to require the likelihood of a violent reaction on the part of the
actual addressee. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
pointed out disapprovingly that the Georgia courts would have
sustained a conviction where abusive language was directed to
"[olne who, on account of circumstances or by virtue of the
obligations of office, cannot actually then and there resent the
same by a breach of the peace ....",72 The Georgia courts were
wrong, according to the majority, in applying the statute to
cases where the actual addressee presented no likelihood of
violence because, for example, he was locked in a cell or stood
on the opposite bank of an impassable torrent. 3 Thus, though
purporting to apply Chaplinsky, the Court in Gooding in fact
overruled it. As Justice Blackmun stated in dissent: "[T]he
7'Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942), citing Elmore v. State,
83 S.E. 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914).
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 526 (1972).
73Id.
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Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky."74
Only three months after Gooding, three more abusive language cases were considered by the Court. In Rosenfeld v. New
Jersey,75 the defendant used the term "m -- f-"....--76 before a
public school board meeting in reference to the board and the
area's teachers. The audience consisted of about 150 people,
including approximately twenty-five women and forty children. For his utterance, Rosenfeld was convicted of disorderly
conduct under a statute prohibiting "loud and offensive or pro7
fane or indecent language in any . . . public place . . .
New Jersey courts had previously narrowed the statute, by
interpretation, to proscribe only words
likely to incite the hearer to an immediate breach of the peace
or to be likely, in the light of the gender and age of the listener
and the setting of the utterance, to affect the sensibilities of
a hearer."'
The majority vacated Rosenfeld's conviction without opinion and remanded for reconsideration in the light of Cohen and
Gooding. Based on the previous analysis of the majority position in those cases, it appears that the unexpressed reasoning
of the majority was that since words which merely offend the
sensibilities of the listeners may not be constitutionally punished (Cohen), the New Jersey statute was overbroad; and, if
there was in fact no clear and present danger of violent reprisal
on the part of the teachers and board members, a conviction
under even a narrowly drawn fighting words statute could not
stand (Gooding).
Justice Powell, though dissenting, agreed that a fighting
words conviction probably could not have been upheld because
* . the good taste and restraint of such an audience may
79
have made it unlikely that physical violence would result.
Thus, even the spokesman for three dissenting Justices apparently agreed that the "clear and present danger" test must be
7,Id. at 537.

408 U.S. 901 (1972).
408 U.S. at 904 (facts in dissenting opinion of Powell, J.).
" N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:170-29(1) (1971).
7 Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 904 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
7

7'Id. at 905.
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applied to fighting words. Justice Powell took a different tack
in arguing for affirmance. Harkening back to the condemnation
in Chaplinsky of words "which by their very utterance inflict
injury . . .,"I' he contended that "a verbal assault on an unwilling audience may be so grossly offensive and emotionally
disturbing as to be the proper subject of criminal proscription
... ,"8 In short, such language should be treated as a public
nuisance whether or not it constitutes fighting words.
The majority disposed of the second case, Brown v.
Oklahoma, 2 in the same manner as it had Rosenfeld-a remand without opinion in the light of Cohen and Gooding.
Brown had been invited to a meeting held in the chapel of the
University of Tulsa to present the viewpoint of the Black
Panthers. The audience consisted of both men and women. In
answer to certain questions Brown referred to various policemen who apparently were not present as "in----- f----- fascist
pig cops. ' 83 He was convicted under a statute prohibiting the
use of "any obscene or lascivious language or word in any public place, or in the presence of females. . ."I' The majority
probably concluded that fighting words were not involved since
the appellation was not used in the presence of the target policemen and that the expression was not obscene because not
erotic. Therefore, Brown had used merely offensive language
which is not punishable under any statute.
The final case of the trilogy, Lewis v. New Orleans,5 presented a sharp fighting words issue. Mrs. Lewis, while her son
was being arrested, intervened and called the arresting officers
"g-- d--- m ---- f- ....police."86 As a result she was herself
charged under an ordinance making it a breach of the peace
wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious
language toward or with reference to any member of the city
police while in the actual performance of his duty. 7
The majority again remanded without opinion, but this time

"

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 906 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
408 U.S. 914.

408 U.S. at 911 (facts in dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
AJId.
"

408 U.S. at 913.
408 U.S. at 909 (facts in dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
Id. at 909-10.
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for reconsideration only in light of Gooding. Apparently the
majority believed that the epithets directed to the officers
might have qualified as fighting words but considered the New
Orleans ordinance overbroad because it had not been interpreted to require a clear and present danger of violent reaction
by the particular addressees.
Perhaps the majority also believed that such a factual
showing could never be made where a police officer is the addressee because, as a result of his training, he is as a matter of
law unlikely to respond with violence no matter what the provocation. Indeed, Justice Powell concurred in the result in
Lewis precisely on the basis of this possibility, saying:
If these words had been addressed by one citizen to another,
face to face and in a hostile manner, I would have no doubt
that they would be "fighting words." But the situation may
be different where such words are addressed to a police officer
trained to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen."
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented in Lewis as well as in Brown and Rosenfeld,
but they did not take issue with the implied application of the
"clear and present danger" test to fighting words. Instead, in
agreement with Justice Powell's dissent in Rosenfeld, they contended that the statutes involved were not overbroad because
under Chaplinsky both fighting words and "'lewd and obscene' and 'profane' ",89 language might properly be punished.
Thus, the dissenters were primarily interested in reasserting
what they felt had been part of the original Chaplinsky holding
from its inception-that offensive language constitutes a separate unprotected class of expression when used before unwilling
hearers in public places even though it is not directed to the
person of a particular listener and therefore does not constitute
fighting words. Unfortunately, in directing their arguments to
this proposition, which the five-man majority summarily rejected, the four dissenters let pass without clear objection the
newly evolved doctrine that even face-to-face insulting lanLewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
408 U.S. 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Id. at 902 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
'
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guage is immune from punishment in the absence of a likelihood of violent response by the actual addressee.
The Court however had not heard the last of Mrs. Lewis.
After the remand for reconsideration in the light of Gooding,
the Louisiana Supreme Court again affirmed her conviction,
stating that the New Orleans ordinance applied only to" 'fighting words' uttered to specific persons at a specific time
... ," The United States Supreme Court once again reversed and remanded.9 A five-man majority, consisting of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Stewart and White, held
that the state court's attempt at a narrowing interpretation
had failed because, although couched in terms of fighting
words, it "wasstill apparent that the Louisiana Supreme Court
would sustain a conviction for the use of opprobrious language
directed to any police officer without a requirement that the
words "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of peace. 9 2 In short, the majority demanded an interpretation of the ordinance which requires a
clear and present danger of violent reaction by the particular
officer-addressee. Justice Powell, again concurring in the result, expressed the concept more clearly:
Quite apart from the ambiguity inherent in the term "opprobrious", words may or may not be "fighting words" depending upon the circumstances of their utterance. It is unlikely, for example, that the words said to have been used
here 93 would have precipitated a physical confrontation between the middle-aged woman who spoke them and the police officer in whose presence they were uttered. The words
may well have conveyed anger and frustration without provoking a violent reaction from the officer.94
Within two months of the second Lewis decision, four more
New Orleans v. Lewis, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. 1972).
" Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
'

415 U.S. at 132. It is unlikely in the context of Lewis II that the majority, by

including the Chaplinsky language ("those [words] which by their very utterance
inflict injury . . .") as a disjunctive definition of fighting words, intended to permit
the punishment of speech which merely hurts the feelings or sensibilities of the addressees. A similar argument, as has been noted, was made without success by the dissenters in Rosenfeld, Brown and Lewis I.
,3"[G]-- d-- m --- f-----.police." Cited in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901,
909 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
",Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974).
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convictions based on abusive language were considered by the
Court. All of the judgments were vacated, and the cases remanded without opinion for further consideration in the light
of Lewis II.15 Apparently the majority considered each of the
statutes involved to be fatally overbroad in one particular or
another. Justice Douglas dissented in each case but only on the
ground that the majority's action was insufficiently strong.
Reasoning that the state courts had already received adequate
guidance as to the principles involved, he simply would have
reversed all four cases without remanding them."
Only one of the cases, Lucas v. Arkansas, 7 drew a dissent
on the merits. In Lucas, a Little Rock policeman on night patrol was variously addressed by the defendants as one of the
"big, bad mother fucking cops," a "chicken shit mother
fucker" and a "sorry son-of-a-bitch". 8 The speakers were convicted under an Arkansas statute which states that a
punishable breach of the peace occurs
[i]f any person shall make use of any profane, violent, vulgar, abusive language toward or about any other person in his
presence or hearing, which language in its common acceptation [sic] is calculated to arouse to anger the person about
or to whom it is spoken or addressed, or to cause a breach of
peace or assault ....
1
Justice Douglas probably expressed the majority's viewKarlan v. Cincinnati, Kelly v. Ohio, Rosen v. California and Lucas v. Arkansas,
416 U.S. 924, 923, 924, 919 (1974).
0 Karlan v. Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Justice Douglas
explained the statutory defects. In Karlan, the Cincinnati ordinance forbade "noisy,
boisterous, rude, insulting or other disorderly. . ." conduct with the intent "to abuse
or annoy any person .

. . ."

The ordinance was overbroad because, as interpreted by

the Ohio courts, it prohibited words which were merely rude and it was not limited to
"words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace." In Kelly, the ordinance of the City of Kent, Ohio, prohibited
"noisy, boisterous or other disorderly

. .

." conduct which "disturb[s] the good order

and quiet of the Municipality." Although the Ohio court found that Kelly's language
in fact constituted fighting words, it did not limit the statute to proscribe only fighting
words. In Rosen, the California statute prohibited, inter alia, the use of "vulgar, profane, or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children ..
"
The California court interpreted the law to permit the punishment of "coarse",
"illbred" or "hardly suitable" language and as such the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad.
9, 416 U.S. 919 (1974).
91416 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1412 (1964).
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point when he noted that the construction of the statute by the
Arkansas court "does not even require that the words be calculated to causd a breach of the peace; it is enough that they are
calculated to arouse anger in the addressee."'' 0 As such, he
contended, the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. His
position in this regard was, of course, correct under Terminiello
if the Arkansas court had in fact so construed the statute.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, however, would have affirmed Lucas' conviction. Apparently finding the majority's objections to be based
on an unduly technical reading of the statute as construed,
they deemed the law sufficiently narrow because it "restricts
the fact finder to language that would, in its common or ordinary acception [sic], be calculated to cause a breach of the
peace."' 0 Justice Blackmun's dissent is particularly noteworthy because at long last he expressly stated that the proper test
for determining whether punishable fighting words have been
spoken is whether the average addressee would be likely to
respond to them with violence. Justice Blackmun found that
the Arkansas statute correctly codified this test, stating:
The statute on its face does not permit or require an inquiry
into the respective boiling points of the particular individuals
or groups involved in each case. . . .In Chaplinsky, the
Court accepted a limiting construction which held that the
statute was "not to be defined in terms of what a particular
addressee thinks. . . .The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause
an average addressee to fight."'' 2
It would seem, therefore, that three Justices now recognize
that to require a clear and present danger of violence in each
instance has no proper place where fighting words are concerned. Unfortunately, the articulation of this point has apparently come too late to persuade what is now a clear majority of
six.
Conclusion
The Justices who authored Chaplinsky in 1942 wrote
''

Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919, 930 (1974).
Id. at 921 n.2.
IId.
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wisely when they initially held that fighting words constitute
a class of speech which lies beyond the pale of the first amendment. Their logic was faultless-the first amendment protects
communication and fighting words are not communication.
Rather, they are instruments of assault and as such their punishment "would raise no question under [the Constitution] .103
The current rationale, that fighting words may be punished only if there is a showing that a violent reaction is likely
to result, leads the Court to absurd results. Strong men who are
unfettered by inhibitions against violence arising from position, training or self-control may be insulted only at the risk
of criminal punishment. But a legless cripple, a feeble old
woman and a dedicated police officer are fair game for the
vilest personal verbal abuse because they are unable or unlikely
to retaliate physically. Indeed, the Court may find itself in the
uncomfortably inconsistent position of applying the standard
of the response of the average addressee, rather than that of the
actual victim, when it believes that a given listener's violent
reaction was unjustified in light of the relatively mild language
used. Further, the application of the "actual addressee" test
may well tend to beg the question; if the addressee did not in
fact respond with violence, he was unlikely to have done so.
Only in the case of an actual violent response is a successful
prosecution of the speaker probable.
It would have been as logical for the Court to require a
finding that the actual addressee of an extortioner's threat was
likely to yield to it before the extortioner may be prosecuted.
Fortunately for our society no cburt has ever held such threats
protected by the first amendment, no matter how unsuccessful
they were likely to be. Fighting words deserve no better treatment.
11

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).

